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Abstract 
In this paper we adopt the methodology developed by Banker et al. (1993) in order to 
investigate the dynamics of the different components of performance for the major European 
telecommunications operators during the period 1989-1993. The results show a general 
improvement in productivity levels and a reduction in the ratio between output and input prices. 
The best productivity performances were attained by the British and (to a lesser degree) the 
French utilities, while only British Telecommunications was remarkably reducing output prices. 
These findings are consistent with the view that incentive regulation is useful to enhance 
efficiency but the introduction and the promotion of competition seems to be more effective in 
reducing the price levels.  
 
 
Keywords: Telecommunications, Performance, Regulation. 
JEL: L96, M40 
 
 
 
 
We would like to thank A. Sembenelli and the participants to a seminar held at CNR, Rome for helpful 
comments and suggestions. Special thanks also to STET for helping us with the data collection.   
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 9/1998 
 2
1. Introduction  
Notwithstanding in the last decade the European telecommunications industry 
has been characterised with strong pushes towards liberalisation, a limited number of 
countries has effectively directed towards privatisation or the introduction of more 
competitive conditions. This is a period of transition with different realities as far as 
market structure, regulatory practises, tariffs and ownership structure are concerned: 
true competition is still very limited in the fixed telephone market and only recently  has 
been introduced in the mobile market, and regulatory practises range from cost based 
rules to price cap mechanisms. Comparing the performances of the main operators 
might be useful for evaluating which path is worthwhile to be followed. 
The empirical literature in this area concentrates generally on the analysis of 
single components of global performance. The studies address different issues such as 
the efficiency of operators, the technical progress, the effects of different regulatory 
mechanisms, or the role of ownership structure and competition. A common drawback 
is that the real components of productivity are not associated with input and output price 
movements in a unified framework. 
In the present work we compare the performance of the main 
telecommunications utilities in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, 
by disaggregating a profitability (revenue/cost) change ratio in four components. The 
latter check for productivity changes, price variations, product mix changes and 
capacity utilisation changes. We will try to assess the role of incentive regulation and 
market structure in determining the performance levels. 
Section 2 offers a critical review of the literature on the economics of the 
telecommunications industry and a contribution to the debate between regulation and 
liberalisation. In section 3 the main characteristics of the industries are sketched for the 
different countries. Section 4 develops the methodology which has been used while 
section 5 presents and comments upon our main results. Section 6 summarises. 
 
2.  Natural monopolies, regulation, privatisation and competition 
2.1 From natural monopoly towards competition 
In most European countries privatisation programmes have been announced and, 
up to a certain extent, partially accomplished in telecommunications. The process is still 
very slow but the prevalent economical and political view is to reinforce it. The 
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nationalisation of the telecommunications industry in the early stages of its 
development has been justified on the grounds that conditions of natural monopoly 
prevail. If average costs are everywhere decreasing or if the minimum efficient scale 
(MES) is high if compared to the level of demand, efficiency considerations would 
require the presence of a single monopolist in the provision of the service. Exogenous 
increases in the level of demand and improvements on the technology shift the demand 
and the average cost curves, and in the new situation there may be room for two or more 
firms. Since both technology and demand have evolved in the telecommunications 
industry, many authors began to argue that the natural monopoly argument was flawed 
(Viscusi et. al, 1994). This is certainly uncontestable in the long distance market 
(Intercity Telecommunication Market, or ITM, in the United States), but is more 
debatable in the local telephone market1 (Armstrong, 1997). 
Assuming that the monopoly is not justified anymore, the State may follow 
different paths in order to reach its objectives, which are broadly summarised by a 
widespread and high quality provision of the telecommunication service at the lowest 
prices. Should the Government regulate the industry in order to counterbalance the 
effects of some remaining market failures or should it deregulate, promoting entry and 
competition? Should it preserve the ownership of dominant firms or should it direct 
towards privatisation?  
As to the first question, Trebing (1989) argues that entry barriers are not likely 
to be high in such a growing and technologically dynamic market. However, the 
telecommunications industry may not be considered as a contestable market because of 
the high sunk costs which render the textbook ‘hit and run’ strategy unfeasible. Laffont, 
Rey and Tirole (1997) point out that a liberalisation of an industry which is not mature 
enough and is still dominated by a small number of firms might stimulate and facilitate 
anticompetitive practises such as collusive behaviour and entry deterrence. Armstrong 
(1997) argues that, due to the presence of fixed connection costs, each premise will 
rather be connected to one network. That network will then enjoy monopoly power even 
                                                 
1  The recent developments of the digital switching technology and the innovations in the cellular 
telephony point to consider also the local telephone market (LTM) as a unnatural monopoly. At 
present, however, cellular systems are used to communicate principally with wire-based systems, so 
that the situation of local monopoly is likely to persist in the near future (Greenwald and Sharkey, 
1989). Even in a context of wire-based networks,  however, Shin and Ying (1992) found that for a 
sample of US local exchange carriers (LECs) the cost function was not subadditive. They concluded 
that the breaking up of LECs would generate cost savings.  
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if the number of competing networks is high. He concludes then that “regulation will 
continue to play an important role in the industry for the foreseeable future”.  
On the other side, Schankerman (1996) and Knieps (1997) believe that the 
adoption of symmetric regulatory rules is the route to be followed, since “all forms of 
asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias towards some firms or technologies and 
run the risk of imposing large productive efficiency costs”. Similarly, Bognetti and 
Fazioli (1997) argue that conduct regulation, that is the regulation at the national level 
of a particular firm (which is generally a monopolist) should be replaced by a structural 
regulation at the European level.  
These two strands are also present in Cave’s paper (1997). He argues that, if 
competition is guaranteed, specific regulatory practises for telecommunication operators 
(such as regulation of prices and entry conditions) might be eliminated in favour of a 
regulation under the antitrust law, following which each behaviour is permitted, 
provided that it is not specifically forbidden (normalised regulation)2.  
The second question implies a digression on the relative efficiency of State 
owned and privately owned firms in managing a particular business in general, and the 
telecommunications service in particular. The literature suggests many efficiency 
advantages of private ownership (capital market monitoring, risk of bankruptcy, well 
defined objectives, etc.). A relevant issue for the telecommunications industry is 
however the comparison between a State owned firm and a private regulated firm. 
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993), through nationalisation the State may have 
external and internal control on firm's activities, while only external control remains 
with a regulated private firm and no control at all with unregulated private firms3. As far 
as incentives to managers are concerned, a regulated private firm is inefficient in that 
there is a duplication of constraints: the regulatory body imposes constraints directly on 
the firm and indirectly on the managers, while the shareholders impose constraints 
directly on the managers: the latter are then more prone to exert lower levels of effort. 
However, in a publicly owned firm managers’ investments may be expropriated ex post 
                                                 
2  The author argues that the UK is evolving towards a normalised regulation, since the regulators are 
reducing the efficiency improvements included in the price-cap formulas and the percentage of sales 
of telecommunication operators subject to control. As to effectiveness of such a policy, however, he is 
more cautious, because “it is by no means certain that competition will be ‘effective’”. 
3  External control refers to the possibility of regulating prices, quality, entry, access pricing, while 
internal control is the control over firm’s inputs, managerial incentives, investment levels, the number 
of employees, etc. 
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and directed towards uses which are different from those foreseen ex ante, so managers 
may be well induced to exert a low level of effort.  
As far as the empirical literature is concerned, results on the effects coming from 
privatisation are ambiguous. Hartley et al. (1991) found improvements in the 
performance of 10 big British firms4 after privatisation. The same results emerge also 
from an empirical investigation on small and medium sized Italian firms (Fraquelli and 
Fabbri, 1997) which have been privatised in the 80's. On the other side, starting from 
the theoretical and empirical work of Yarrow (1986), many scholars showed some 
doubts on the positive effects of a change of property tout-court. In particular, the 
analysis of productivity is favourable to private ownership in competitive markets 
whereas for industries characterised by conditions of natural monopoly a tight 
regulation appears to be an optimal second best solution. 
 
2.2. Regulation and Incentives 
The price system of a public service should be oriented to balance the well 
known objectives of efficiency and equity: in other words it should keep an eye on the 
waste of public resources, while with the other it should allow a fair distribution of the 
firm’s allowed revenue among the beneficiaries of the service. Price regulation might be 
classified in two broad categories: social contracts or price caps on the one hand and 
rate of return or cost reimbursement schemes on the other. 
Rate of return regulation has the primary goal of approaching the theoretical 
results of competition, where costs and revenues equate each other. Consumers bear the 
risks of cost increases and enjoy the benefits of cost reductions. In such an environment 
it could be easier for firms to meet good quality requirements and to undertake some 
innovative but risky investments. On the other hand, many authors starting from the 
work of Averch and Johnson (1962) have stressed some inefficiencies of rate of return 
regulation, on the grounds that it can induce a misallocation of resources. The "A-J 
effect" suggests that if the allowed rate of return exceeds the correct remuneration of 
capital firms will overinvest in capital5. 
                                                 
4  Their sample comprehends also some firms still subject to state ownership but characterised by 
interventions towards privatisation 
5  Moreover, a diversified firm operating both in a competitive and in a monopoly market, under profit 
level regulation on the combined markets might have a long run incentive to price below the long run 
marginal cost in the competitive market, while raising prices in the monopoly market. Potential 
entrants might then find it difficult to enter the competitive market (Doyle, 1994). 
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Price cap regulation is based on direct price constraints and could more 
effectively replace the indirect rate of return regulation. Under price level regulation the 
allowed revenues are not linked to the internal costs anymore and firms are pushed to 
minimise costs. However, some drawbacks have to be pointed out. First, risks of 
increases in costs are to be borne by the firm, which may be reluctant towards new 
innovative investments6. Second, it becomes more difficult to support unprofitable but 
socially desirable strategies such as a complete coverage in the service, unless this 
constraint is not directly imposed in the regulatory scheme. 
Braeutigam and Panzar (1993) argue that a potentially competitive market may 
be well regulated through price caps. This is a second best strategy and should be 
considered as transitory in the process of deregulation and liberalisation. In natural 
monopolies, however, the advantages of price caps over other forms of price regulation 
(rate of return regulation or hybrid methods) are less clear cut. 
 
2.3. The effects on the performance of Telecommunications operators 
In the previous sub-sections we discussed in general terms the pros and cons of 
privatisation, regulation and liberalisation in a market such as that of 
telecommunications services. A particular intervention influences firms’ incentives in a 
specific direction, and this in turn generates different expectations as far as firms’ 
performance, market structure and prices to the final consumer are concerned. When 
one passes from the theory to the empirical analysis, a number of problems arise. This 
point is made for example by Kridel et al (1996). In their review of the effectiveness of 
incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry they point out that it is 
extremely difficult to disentangle the effects of regulation from the ones coming from 
privatisation and competition as far as performance, quality in the service, productivity, 
investments, prices and innovation are concerned. Our study is not an exception to this. 
However, as it will be made clear in the next section, by disentangling the different 
components of profitability, we are able to check simultaneously for four dimensions of 
firm’s performance (productivity, price recovery, capacity utilisation and product mix). 
Since our firms operate in partially different market and regulatory contexts, the 
                                                 
6  Solimene (1995) found that for British Telecom price caps had the effect of rationalising, instead of 
reducing, long run investments in R&D.  
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dynamics of their performance results will be put in relation with the incentive 
regulation and market structure they have to face.    
 
3. The principal European players and the structure of competition 
While in the future deregulation and liberalisation might prevail, regulation and 
a gradual introduction of more competition appear to be more feasible short term 
realities in Europe, given the high interests at play in the telecommunications market. 
“Experience in many countries shows that the devil is in the details and that competition 
does not arrive overnight” (Waverman and Sirel, 1997). Table 1 (elaborated from the 
data included in Levington, 1997) summarises the situation of the industry in 1994, 
highlighting some broad differences between firms as far as private ownership, 
regulation and the degree of competition are concerned.  
We are confident that the firms examined in our study during the period 1989-93 
represent fairly the whole telecommunications markets in their respective countries. 
This is certainly true for France Telecom (FT) and Telefonica (TS). The former was 
operating as a vertically integrated monopoly. The latter has been a monopolist up to 
1992, when the Spanish government started a process of deverticalisation by 
withdrawing some lines of business and by opening the mobile market and the provision 
of value added services to other operators. As far as Deutsche Telekom (DT) and 
Telecom Italia (TI) are concerned, the monopolistic situation is slightly counterbalanced 
by some competition in the value added services (VAS) and by the presence of a second 
operator in the mobile market after 19897. Finally, notwithstanding British 
Telecommunications (BT) was privatised in 1984 and put in competition with Mercury, 
it has always enjoyed a position of relative strength8.  
In short, the monopolistic structures are still well widespread everywhere with 
the exception of the UK which appears to be the only country with a competitive 
environment9. The price regulation is however more differentiated. In the UK entry 
conditions, access prices and telephone tariffs have been regulated since the 
                                                 
7  The competition in the mobile market was however limited in that the new companies were in the 
earlier stages of their activity. 
8  BT does not cover the whole market for the examined period, but its weight and market power are 
still very strong. 
9  However, it should be pointed out that presence on the British market of two operators started to 
produce its effects only in the latest years. The gradual strengthening of Mercury led competition in 
the long distance and in the international telecommunication markets. 
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privatisation of BT. OFTEL is a regulatory institution independent from the government 
appointed to monitor prices on the basis of a price cap mechanism. France is oriented to 
the control of efficiency through price ceilings too10. Conversely, Italy, Spain and 
Germany are characterised by price controls based on the recovery of costs. Since the 
former two have known a great development in the diffusion of traditional services 
during the 80’s, a rate of return type regulation certainly facilitated investments but 
might have had negative repercussions on productivity growth. Finally, in the German 
market the unification in 1990 led to the restructuring of the industry with massive 
investments. 
 
4. The methodology: four components of performance 
A traditional measure of firm’s financial performance is the ratio between 
operating profits and assets11 (return on investments, or ROI) which can be usefully 
decomposed as follows: 
 
            Operating Profit            Sales 
ROI =        ·                                                                        [1] 
                     Sales                    Assets 
 
The left term of the right hand side is the return on sales (ROS), while the right 
term is an index of the turnover of assets. The ROS ratio might be expressed as: 
 
                   Sales - Operating Profits 
ROS = 1 -        = 1 - Π-1            [2] 
                     Sales  
where Π=sales/operating costs is an index of profitability measured on costs (revenue-
cost ratio) which can be compared in different periods. If we eliminate the effects of 
changes in input and output prices, Π is useful as an index of productivity. By 
comparing Π in two periods it is possible to examine separately the effects of changes 
in prices, the quantities being constant, or the variations in productivity, the prices being 
constant. This is the approach followed by the American Productivity Center (APC, 
1981). Banker et al. (1993) extended the APC method by disaggregating the Π ratio in 
                                                 
10  The French model is particularly interesting in that it foresees a contract of programme between the 
government and FT. Some efficiency and quality targets are defined, such as a yearly reduction of 3% 
in real tariffs for the period 1991-1994.  
11   Fisher and McGowan (1983), among others, criticises the use of accounting measures for inferring 
something about economic rates of returns. For a discussion, see Wilson (1992). 
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four components. The above development provides the analyst with a richer set of 
information: a firm might be profitable due to higher prices, or because it is very 
efficient in activating inputs or in choosing the product mix, or because it has not 
overinvested in capacity. 
Let us define: 
Yti, the quantity of output i in period t, i=1,...,n; 
pti, the price of output i in period t, i=1,....,n; 
XtV, the quantity of the variable input v in period t, v=1,....,m; 
wtV, the price of the variable input v in period t, v=1,.....,m; 
XtF, the quantity of the fixed input F in period t, F=1,...,g; 
wtF, the price of the fixed input F in period t, F=1,....,g; 
∏t, the ratio between sales and costs in period t; 
 
The revenue-cost index in period t (∏t) will be: 
( )Π t i ti it VtV Vt FtF FtY p X w X w= +∑ ∑ ∑/     [3] 
and its variation (RCCR) between t and t0 will be: 
( )
( )RCCR
Y p X w X w
Y p X w X w
t i
t
i
t
V
t
V V
t
F
t
F F
t
i i VV V FF F
= = ++
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑Π Π/
/
/
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
      [4] 
Since we are interested in comparing the performance of different firms in the 
period 1989-1993 we need for each firm an index of relative performance. The 
benchmark (period t=0) in principle could be a firm with some particular characteristics 
or simply a hypothetical firm with outputs, inputs and prices corresponding to the 
average values of the examined firms. The relative position of each firm with respect to 
the average firm and the evolution upon time of its performance can then be analysed. 
For each component of the revenue cost change ratio (RCCR)  the results achieved by 
each single firm will be therefore compared with some standard values. The four 
components of RCCR and the standardisation procedures are as follows12: 
 
 
 
                                                 
12  For more details on the methodology, see Banker et al. (1993 and 1996). 
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a) Productivity ratio (TFP) 
A higher productivity level in period t occurs when, by applying standard inputs 
(QtV and QtF) instead of actual inputs (XtV and XtF) an increase in the costs would result. 
( )
( )TFP
w Q w Q
w X w X
V
t
V V
t
F
t
F F
t
V
t
V V
t
F
t
F F
t
= ++
∑ ∑
∑ ∑             [5] 
The standard variable input needed in period t (QtV) is obtained by multiplying 
the standard input requirement αvi per unit of output by the quantity produced in period 
t13. 
Q Y where and YV
t
Vi i
t
i
Vi i
t= ⋅ ≥ ≥∑α α; 0 0             [6] 
The standard quantity of fixed inputs per period t (QtF) is obtained by 
multiplying the standard fixed input requirement per unity of capacity βF by the actual 
capacity activated in period t14: QtF = βF CAPt; 
 
b) Price recovery ratio (PRREC). 
The index highlights the impact on profitability of variations in relative prices. 
The output quantities are held constant at the actual level and the input requirements are 
held constant at the standard levels defined above15. 
 
( )
( )PRREC
p Y w Q w Q
p Y w Q w Q
i i
t
i
t
V
t
V V
t
F
t
F F
t
i i i
t
VV V
t
FF F
t
= ++
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
/
/0 0 0
                     [7] 
 
c) Product Mix (PRMIX) 
                                                 
13  Proxies for the coefficients αvi  are obtained by regressing the physical quantity of the variable input 
(for the pooled sample of observations across time periods and across firms) on the physical quantities 
of the different outputs Yit. If the input v is used to produce a single output i, the sum in [6] disappears 
and QtV = αvi  ·Yit. 
14  βF is obtained by dividing the average level of fixed inputs across time periods and across firms by the 
average level of capacity. 
15  The standard prices poi, wov and woF , as well as the standard quantities XoV, XoF and Yoi , are average 
values across time periods and across firms.  
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In order to individualise changes in the product mix, fixed inputs are considered 
at standard input requirements as well as at standard levels of capacity, while variable 
inputs are still kept at standard quantities:  
 
( )
( )PRMIX
p Y w Q w G
p Y w Q w G
i i i
t
VV V
t
FF F
t
i i i VV V FF F
= ++
∑ ∑ ∑
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0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
/
/
           [8] 
While QtF assumes standard fixed input requirements and allows for capacity to 
vary, GtF assumes a standard level of capacity: GtF = βF µt, where µt is the standard 
capacity required for producing ∑Yit. 
 
d)Variations in capacity utilization (CAP) 
If we hold standard input requirements αvi and βF and compare fixed inputs at 
standard capacity requirements (GtF) with fixed inputs at actual capacity (QtF) we have 
an index of the variation in capacity utilization: 
CAP
w Q w G
w Q w Q
VV V
t
FF F
t
VV V
t
FF F
t=
+
+
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
0 0
0 0             [9] 
 
By multiplying the four indices above we obtain the revenue/cost change ratio in 
[4]. To be more specific, we obtain: 
 ( )
( )
Y p X w X w
Y p Q w G w
i
t
i
t
V
t
V V
t
F
t
F F
t
i i VV V FF F
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
+
+
/
/0 0 0 0 0 0
          [10] 
Since we are using t=0 as a benchmark, standard and actual values when t=0 
coincide. Thus, QV
0 = XV
0  and QF
0 = G F
0 = XF
0  and expression [10] reduces exactly to 
equation [4]. 
The advantages of the disaggregation in four indices as compared to the 
traditional APC method are apparent: the latter is able only to detect a productivity 
change ratio and a price recovery ratio. In fact, following the APC method, equation [4] 
is decomposed in: 
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RCCR=
( )
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/
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The first term is and index of productivity change, while the second term is an 
index of price recovery change. The richness of the method used in this investigation is 
to separate the pure effects of price and productivity changes from changes in capacity 
utilisation and in the product mix16.  
 
5. The empirical investigation 
Table 2 records some data on our sample firms. Several differences should be 
stressed before starting the empirical analysis. TI and TS started a catching up process 
during the eighties while Germany was forced to restructure the telecommunications 
industry after the reunification. This is clearly reflected in the high levels of some 
indices: fixed assets per main lines, investment/sales ratio, growth rate of main lines and 
growth rate of sales. Moreover, since Italy has the highest cost of labour, TI tried to 
save on the number of employees. This is confirmed in the ratios sales/employees and 
main lines/employees17. As far as performance is concerned, the ROI index highlights 
the optimal position of BT as compared to the other four firms. However, by looking at 
the gross operating income/invested capital ratio18 different indications emerge. It 
appears that depreciation and the nature of new investments do play an important role 
on firms’ performance. As we will show, similar levels of profitability may well origin 
from very different operational conditions. It turns out that a careful comparison 
between companies cannot rely only upon a quick analysis of a few number of indices. 
Moreover, the analysis which follows is particularly apt to investigate the dynamic 
aspects of the various components of performance. 
 
5.1. The data base 
In the construction of the RCCR index we consider one variable cost input 
(external costs, a category which groups raw materials, other operating costs, payment 
                                                 
16  For applications of the APC method, see Banker et al (1996) and Fraquelli and Vannoni (1999). 
17  A reduced number of workers could imply also a different degree of vertical integration or lower 
levels of quality in the service (percentage of public telephones out of work, average waiting time for 
the installation of new lines, percentage of technical faults, etc.) 
18  The gross operating income is the difference between sales and the sum of external costs and labour 
costs, and is not including depreciation costs. 
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to telephone operators, supply and other services) and two fixed cost inputs 
(depreciation and labour). Sales are disaggregated in three categories: monthly 
subscription, telephone sales and other sales. After having deflated and converted to the 
Italian currency (by applying an average exchange rate) the figures drawn from the 
balance sheets, the revenue cost ratios are constructed by dividing the aggregated sales 
by the sum of variable and fixed input costs. In order to obtain prices for inputs and 
outputs we need to divide revenues and costs by some measures of physical outputs and 
physical inputs. Physical outputs which have been used are telephone calls for 
telephone sales and number of main lines for monthly subscription and for other sales19. 
The number of employees has been used as the physical input for labour costs and for 
external costs and the number of main lines as a physical input for depreciation and as 
an index of capacity.  
 
5.2 The results 
As far as the revenue/cost change ratio is concerned the data in table 3 show a 
process of convergence with a initial range of 0.81-1.22 which reduces to 0.97-1.04. TI, 
BT and TS increased their profitability, while DT reduced it and FT showed a stable 
pattern. Capacity utilisation and productivity change are responsible for the  
profitability result of Italy while increased productivity counterbalanced by lower price 
recovery indices explain the weak increases of Spain and the UK and the decreasing 
pattern for Germany.  
As to price recovery, TI seems to be the only firm without a decreasing pattern. 
The index may be decomposed in output price changes and input price changes. By 
looking at table 4, the firm which appears to have most intensively reduced prices is 
BT, followed with DT and, to a lesser extent, by FT. The large decrease in the price 
recovery ratio is in fact partly due to the increase in input prices. A particular case is 
Italy, where the change in the price recovery index is due to an effort for reducing input 
prices, while output prices remain basically constant. Turning to the other ratios, it 
appears that all firms have directed towards a slight increase in capacity utilisation and 
                                                 
19 Banker et al (1998) argue that ‘the deployment of lines is not under management control since they 
have to be supplied on demand to various customers at prices which are regulated for certain 
customer categories’, and suggest that lines may well be considered as an output. 
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towards a higher level of productivity20, while for the change in the product mix the 
positive effects are limited to TS, DT, and TI. 
Figure 1 plots the average values of the indices across firms. It is possible to 
notice that in the 1989-1993 period the telecommunications operators increased 
productivity and, to a much lesser extent, capacity utilisation, while they reduced the 
price recovery ratio. Finally, the product mix change ratio did not change. These 
outcomes are overall consistent with the results one would expect in  view of a more 
dynamic and competitive environment. As far as the performances of the single firms 
are concerned table 5 highlights that BT has been characterised with the highest 
improvements in productivity (47%, followed by FT and DT at 12% and by TI and TS 
at 9%). Moreover, table 5 reveals that only BT has reduced the level of output prices to 
a great extent (17% of decrease in the index for BT as compared to -9% for DT and -3% 
for FT).  
A first look at the productivity results seems to suggest that the different 
incentive price regulations characterising the telecommunications industries in the five 
European countries examined here have not bring significant differences. However, as 
we will argue below, the price-cap mechanisms in the UK and in France may well have 
been important in stimulating efficiency improvements. The higher level of competition 
in the UK and the private ownership, on the other side, seem to be reflected in the 
excellent performance of BT, as far as productivity improvements and output price 
change are concerned.  
 
5.3. Robustness  
We have tried different variants to the basic model discussed in section 5.1. 
First, instead of using the number of calls, we tried an alternative measure of the 
physical output for telephone sales, and namely the total number of minutes21, while the 
total number of main lines was still the physical output for monthly subscription and 
other sales. Second, we used the geometric average of calls (or minutes) and lines as the 
physical output for other sales. This has been done since, differently from the case of 
                                                 
20  The absolute level of productivity for TI is very high, and this is certainly influenced by the relatively 
fewer number of workers. 
21  While the total number of calls was available for all 5 firms (even if for TS it was not available for all 
the years) data on the total number of minutes were available only for TI and FT. Total number of 
minutes for the other three firms have been imputed by assuming that they shared for each year the 
average number of minutes per main line of TI and FT. 
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monthly subscriptions, which are unequivocally linked to the number of main lines, 
under the label ‘other sales’ are grouped a set of non homogeneous revenues such as 
equipment supply, directory and books, data and fac-simile transmission, cable TV, 
other services to consumers, and so on. Most of them are linked to the number of access 
lines, but some items are probably connected to the number of calls. The results are 
robust to different assumptions about the relative weights of calls (or minutes) and  lines 
in explaining our three main categories of sales. Finally, we tried also to vary the 
exchange rates chosen to normalise the balance sheets values, and again no significant 
changes have been detected. 
 
5.4. An assessment 
Staranczack et al (1994) conducted a study on the productivity growth of the 
telecommunications industries in a sample of 10 OECD countries for the period 1984-
1987. They found that productivity growth was determined mainly by output growth 
and by the private ownership of firms, while the variables controlling for the degree of 
competition and for technological change were found to be unimportant22. Considering 
our sample, DT was interested by the highest output growth (12.8% in term of number 
of calls), followed by TS (8.6%), TI (8%), FT (7%) and BT (2.6%)23. The increase in 
the output sold cannot then provide a satisfactory explanation for the high productivity 
performances obtained by BT and FT (see table 3)24. Instead, it seems that the incentive 
regulation activated in France and in the UK played a positive role. 
Banker et al (1995) found patterns similar to our results for the US telecommunication 
operators in the period 1988-91, except from the capacity utilisation index, which was 
found to be practically constant. However, in the period 1981-87, their sample of firms 
had increased both the capacity utilisation and the product mix indices. Following 
liberalisation, firms should concentrate on segments for which high price-cost margins 
are expected, but a successive introduction of more competition may reduce the price 
cost margins for all services. Thus, firms cannot increase the average profitability by 
changing the product mix. Our results for this variable resemble the ones reached by 
Banker et al (1995) for the 1989-91 sample. As far as capacity utilisation is concerned, 
                                                 
22  The authors did not include a variable checking for the effects of different regulatory practises. 
23   The same low levels for FT and BT are evidenced in table 2 with reference to the growth rate of sales. 
24  Output growth could explain however the high change in productivity recorded by DT. 
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one should expect an increase in the index. The upward trend of CAP might  suggest 
that some firms are possibly reverting an Averch-Johnson type effect. However, the 
weak increase could reflect also strategic plans of firms to restructure their networks in 
view of the future tougher competition at the international level, so that the pressure on 
capacity utilisation is accordingly reduced.  
It is also interesting to compare the methodology developed by Banker et al 
(1993) with the traditional APC method. Since the product mix ratio does not vary and 
the capacity utilisation increases only slightly, the two approaches in this case give 
similar results, as can be easily seen from Figure 2. The only noticeable difference is 
that productivity changes with the APC method are overestimated when CAP is higher 
than one and underestimated when CAP is lower than one (see figure 1).  
 
6.  Conclusions 
In the paper it is argued that the information coming from a single component of 
profitability of telecommunications operators (productivity, price dynamics) is 
inadequate in order to investigate issues such as the importance of competition and the 
impact of different regulatory practises. 
The European leaders showed similar profitability change ratios in 1993 together 
with a general improvement in productivity and in the capacity utilisation change ratio 
in the period 1989-1993. The ratio between output and input prices decreased as well. 
The firms however behaved differently: BT directed towards a significant reduction in 
output prices while the productivity improvements of DT and, in a particular way, of  
FT were accompanied by an increase in inputs prices and by a limited reduction in 
output prices. The disaggregation of data proposed in the paper, which allows for a 
more rich treatment than the one suggested by the APC methodology, is useful for 
analysing the trade off between regulation and competition. The good dynamics of the 
productivity change ratios, associated with the trend of demand growth, is stressing the 
good results of BT and FT. The latter are both operating in countries characterised by 
similar regulatory rules but they differ significantly as far as the structure of 
competition is concerned. A deeper look at  the components of the price recovery ratio 
suggests that, while a different regulatory regime is able to influence the productivity, a 
higher level of competition seems to be the only way for a strong reduction of prices to 
the benefit of the final consumer. 
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Table 1 - Comparative Utility Regulation (situation until 1994) 
 France Germany Italy Spain UK 
Industry structure Vertically 
integrated 
monopoly 
Monopoly in fixed 
networks 
VAS and customer 
premises equipment 
are free 
Monopoly in fixed 
and Duopoly in 
Mobile networks. 
VAS and 
transmission are free 
Monopoly in fixed 
and mobile networks 
Data transmission 
and VAS are free 
Duopoly till 1991 
From 1991 the 
market is fully 
liberalised 
Incumbent's (BT) 
market dominance 
remains strong 
Companies involved France Telecom Deutsche Bundespost 
Telekom 
STET (holding) 
Telecom Italia 
Telecom Italia Mobile 
Omnitel Pronto Italia 
Telefonica British 
Telecommunications 
Mercury 
Jonica 
Energis (1994) 
Cable companies 
Ownership State firm Public enterprise part 
of federal 
administration 
The only private firm 
is O.P.I. 
Private firm (30% of 
State ownership) 
Private firms 
Competition Fixed networks: 
absent 
VAS and mobile 
networks: very 
low 
Fixed networks: 
absent 
VAS and mobile 
networks: yes 
Fixed networks: 
absent 
Mobile networks: 
very low 
Fixed and mobile 
networks: absent 
VAS: yes 
At the local level: low 
Long distance and 
international markets: 
increasing 
VAS: yes 
Price regulation Planning contract 
with a price cap 
regulation. 3% red.
of tariffs in real 
terms  (1991-94) 
Cost based  
Regulation 
Cost based approved 
by the Government 
Cost based approved 
by the Government 
Price cap on a 
weighted basket of 
services 
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Table 2 - The major EU players (values expressed in Italian liras) 
 Telecom 
It. 
British 
Telecom 
France 
Telecom 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
Telefonica
Sales 1994* 
(Yearly growth rate 
1989-1994) 
29100 
(10.7%) 
33546 
(2.4%) 
30715 
(6.3%) 
44954 
(9.8%) 
16635 
(12.4%) 
Employees 1994 96815 148500 152568 225400 73274 
Main Lines  1994** 
(Yearly growth rate 
1989-1994) 
24542 
(2%) 
27201 
(1.7%) 
31600 
(3%) 
39200 
(6%) 
14685 
(4.4%) 
ROI  
(average 89-94) 9.3% 21.7% 13% 10.2% 10% 
Gross operating 
income / Invested 
capital (av. 89-92)  
33.2% 33.7% 28.2% 25.2% 20.6% 
Sales / main lines ** 
(1994) 1087 1159 950 1102 1102 
Sales / employees ** 
(1994) 304000 226000 201000 199000 227000 
Lines / employees 
(1994) 280 195 212 181 206 
Investment / Sales 
(1994) 28.5% 19.2% 25.7% 29.4% 29.4% 
Fixed assets / main 
lines (1994)** 3896 2495 2405 3681 4801 
*   Billions 
** Thousands 
Source: our elaborations on Stet data 
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Table 3 - Four Components of Performance 
 Revenue-
Cost Ratio 
Price 
Recovery 
Product  mix Capacity 
utilisation 
Productivity
Telecom Italia 
1989 0.81 0.66 0.98 0.97 1.29 
1990 0.81 0.64 0.99 0.98 1.32 
1991 0.84 0.64 0.99 0.99 1.34 
1992 0.89 0.64 1.00 1.01 1.38 
1993 0.97 0.68 1.00 1.02 1.41 
France Telecom 
1989 0.98 1.11 0.97 0.92 0.99 
1990 1.01 1.09 0.97 0.93 1.02 
1991 1.01 1.06 0.97 0.94 1.04 
1992 1.00 1.02 0.98 0.95 1.07 
1993 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.96 1.11 
Deutsche Telekom 
1989 1.22 1.45 0.98 0.96 0.89 
1990 1.15 1.30 0.99 0.98 0.92 
1991 1.09 1.17 0.99 1.00 0.94 
1992 1.09 1.12 1.00 1.01 0.96 
1993 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 
British Telecom 
1989 0.98 1.26 1.01 1.06 0.73 
1990 1.00 1.19 1.01 1.07 0.77 
1991 0.99 1.10 1.01 1.07 0.83 
1992 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.05 0.96 
1993 1.00 0.86 1.02 1.07 1.07 
Telefonica 
1989 0.97 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.03 
1990 0.99 0.95 1.00 1.01 1.04 
1991 1.03 0.95 1.00 1.02 1.06 
1992 1.03 0.92 1.00 1.02 1.09 
1993 1.04 0.88 1.01 1.04 1.12 
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    Table 4 - Price recovery 
 Price Recovery Output price changes
ΣipitYit/Σipi0Yit 
Input price changes 
ΣvwvtQvt+ΣFwFtQFt  Σvwv0Qvt+ΣFwF0QFt 
 
Telecom Italia 
1989 0.66 0.89 1.35 
1990 0.64 0.88 1.38 
1991 0.64 0.90 1.40 
1992 0.64 0.89 1.38 
1993 0.68 0.89 1.32 
France Telecom 
1989 1.11 1.01 0.90 
1990 1.09 0.98 0.90 
1991 1.06 1.03 0.97 
1992 1.02 1.01 0.99 
1993 0.94 0.98 1.04 
Deutsche Telekom 
1989 1.45 1.11 0.76 
1990 1.30 1.07 0.82 
1991 1.17 1.03 0.88 
1992 1.12 1.05 0.93 
1993 1.00 1.01 1.01 
British Telecom 
1989 1.26 1.17 0.93 
1990 1.19 1.11 0.93 
1991 1.10 1.05 0.95 
1992 0.98 1.01 1.03 
1993 0.86 0.97 1.13 
Telefonica 
1989 0.95 0.90 0.95 
1990 0.95 0.92 0.97 
1991 0.95 0.96 1.00 
1992 0.92 0.98 1.07 
1993 0.88 0.93 1.05 
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Table 5 - A Synthesis  
 
 
Profitability Productivity Price 
Recovery 
Product  
Mix 
Capacity 
utilisation 
France 0 +++ --- 0 + 
Germany --- +++ ---- + ++ 
Italy +++ ++ + + + 
Spain ++ ++ -- + + 
United Kingdom + ++++ ---- 0 + 
 
0 = no significant changes 
+ = improvement 
- = worsening 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Average Performance Trends
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Figure 2 - Comparison with the APC method
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